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Averroes on Psychology and the 
Principles of Metaphysics I 
R I C H A R D  C. T A Y L O R  
FIRST TRANSLATED FROM Arab ic  in to  La t in  in  the  ear ly  t h i r t e e n t h  cen tu ry ,  the  
ph i losoph ica l  works  of  Ave r roes  were  in i t ia l ly  r e spec t ed  as va luab le  aids to 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  the  t rue  p h i l o s o p h y  of  Aris tot le .  Wi l l i am of  A u v e r g n e ,  B i shop  
of  Paris  a n d  a u t h o r  o f  a ph i lo soph ica l ly  as tu te  theologica l  synthesis  o f  G r e e k  
a n d  Arab ic  t h o u g h t  wi th  C h r i s t i a n  doc t r ine ,  o p e n l y  expressed  his a p p r e c i a t i o n  
wi th  pra i se  for  Aver roes .  B u t  by the  m i d - t h i r t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  m a n y  o f  Aver roes '  
t each ings  were  u n d e r  a t tack wi th  his c o n c e p t i o n s  of  h u m a n  n a t u r e  a n d  separa te  
i m m a t e r i a l  in te l lec t  the subjec t  o f  sha rp ly  focussed  a n d  h e a t e d  a r g u m e n t a t i v e  
assaul ts  by A q u i n a s ,  A l b e r t  a n d  o t h e r s 3  T h e i r  a r g u m e n t s  were  n o t  p r i m a r i l y  
theologica l  b u t  r a t h e r  ph i lo soph ica l  cr i t icisms which  c h a r g e d  tha t  Aver roes ,  
Drafts of this paper were presented at a conference sponsored by the International Society 
for the History of Arabic and Islamic Science and Philosophy at the Smithsonian Institution in 
Washington, DC, March 28, 1996, and at the annual meeting of the Medieval Academy of 
America in Toronto, Canada, April 19, 1997. I benefited from discussions of this article with 
Alfred Ivry, my colleagues, David B. Twetten, Owen Goldin and Michael Wreen, and from the 
suggestions of two evaluators forJHP. 
2 This has long been recognized. "The reception of these translations of Averroes' commentar- 
ies by Christian philosophers may be described by a term currently in vogue as ambivalent. They 
praised him as commentator but damned him as theologian . . . .  Already in the thirteenth century, 
while he was hailed by William of Auvergne (a228-1249) as 'the most noble philosopher' 
(philosophus nobilissimus), by St. Thomas as 'the Commentator' (Commentator), and Dante as 'he who 
made the grand commentary (ilgran commento),' he was decried by all of these, as well as others, for 
certain heretical views. Special books were written against him and time and again he was publicly 
condemned." H. A. Wolfson, "The Twice-Revealed Averroes," in Studies in the History of Philosophy 
and Religion, 2 vols., ed. Isadore Twersky and George H. Wifliams (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1973), vol. 1, 371-4ol. See z72-373. Also see Bernardo Carlos Bazfin, 
"On 'First Averroism' and its Doctrinal Background," in Of Scholars, Savants, and their Texts: Studies in 
Philosophy and Religious Thought. Essays in Honor of Arthur Hyman, ed. Ruth Link-Salinger et alii (New 
York/Bern: Peter Lang, x989) , 9-2~. For a discussion of the influence of the psychology of 
Averroes, see Edward Mahoney, "Sense, Intellect, and Imagination in Albert, Thomas, and Siger," 
in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann et alii (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), chapter 3 o, 6o~-62~. 
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par t icular ly  in his Psychology, failed to unde r s t and  Aristotle and  mis repre -  
sented Aristotle 's  t hough t  in his confused exposi t ion of  Aristotle 's  Psychology.  
This  is so wel l -known to us in ou r  own day that  Averroes '  n a m e  has even m a d e  
its way into Copi 's  e l emen ta ry  logic text  as pa r t  o f  an exercise using a quota t ion 
f r o m  Duns  Scotus in which this Islamic ph i losopher  is called "Tha t  accursed 
Averroes ."  Scotus remarks  that  
9 [A]ll philosophers commonly assign "rational" as the difference that properly de- 
fines man, meaning by "rational" that the intellective soul is an essential part of man. 
In fact, to put it briefly, no philosopher of any note can be found to deny this except 
that accursed Averroes (ille maledictus Averroes) in his commentary on De anima, Bk III, 
where his fantastic conception, intelligible neither to himself nor to others, assumes the 
intellective part of man to be a sort of separate substance united to man through the 
medium of sense images.3 
In  a genera l  way Averroes '  n a m e  has been  associated with naturalistic t hough t  
labeled "Latin Aver ro i sm"  which a p p e a r e d  to deny  the persona l  immor ta l i ty  
of  the soul, to follow Aristotle r ega rd ing  the e terni ty  of  the world, and  to place 
the rat ional  in priori ty to the religious. Not  at all surprisingly,  such an unde r -  
s tanding of  Averroes '  t hough t  sees h im as a personif icat ion not  only of  reli- 
gious u n o r t h o d o x y  well deserving of  suppress ion  and  correct ion in the cul- 
tural  contexts  o f  Medieval  Christ iani ty and  Islam, but  also of  phi losophical  
foolishness and  of  heresy against  the Aristotel ian tradition.4 
Such a view of  the work  o f  Averroes ,  however ,  is in pa r t  a consequence  of  a 
failure to apprec ia te  fully the dep th  o f  reflection which Aver roes  b r o u g h t  to 
Aristotelian texts and  phi losophical  principles.  His  account  of  the re la t ionship 
o f  phi losophical  Psychology and  metaphys ics  and  of  how Psychology provides  
key principles  bo th  for  the es tabl ishment  o f  the science of  Metaphysics  and  for  
the explana t ion  o f  separate  intellect. T h a t  account  provides  evidence of  a 
sophist icated mind  at work weaving f r o m  Aristotel ian threads  a cohe ren t  cloth 
of  metaphysical  teachings.  A n d  what  provides  the basis for  this accoun t  is 
3John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Lib. IV Sententiarum (Ordinatio) Dist. 43, q.2, in Opera Omnia 
(Lugduni: Sumptibus Laurentii Durand, 1639), vol. ao: 32, translated by Allan Wolter in Duns 
Scotus. Philosophical Writings (Edinburgh and London, 1962), 146-147 and quoted by Irving M. 
Copi and Carl Cohen in Introduction toLogic, 8th ed. (New York and London, a99o), 127. I want to 
thank my Marquette University colleague, Michael Wreen, for calling my attention to this passage 
in Copi. 
4Bonaventure has long been recognized as being among the most insightful and critical of the 
Latin theologians alarmed by the teachings of Averroes and his Latin admirers. See Etienne 
Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: Random House, 1955), 4 ~ 1 7 6  9 
It seems doubtful that  "local political infighting" was the sole or even primary reason for the 
suppression of philosophy which resulted in the banishment  of Averroes toward the end of his 
life. See Oliver Leaman, Averroes and his Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988 ), 4- Cf. Richard 
C. Taylor, "Personal Immortality in Averroes' Mature Philosophical Psychology," Documenti e Studi 
sulla TradizioneFilosofica Medievale 9 0998) 87-  a lo. 
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no th ing  o the r  than  his controversial  and  se ldom unde r s tood  doct r ine  of  the 
separa te  Material  Inte l lect  which is one for  all humank ind .  T h e  p resen t  article 
concerns  that  teaching on separa te  intellect and  aims to show how Aver roes  
can assert  in his Long Commentary on the De Anima and in his Long Commentary on 
the Metaphysics that  pr inciples  for  the science o f  Metaphysics are established in 
the science o f  Psychology, a science which is itself a b ranch  of  Natura l  Philoso- 
phy  or Physics. 
1 .  
At the beg inn ing  of  chapte r  1 of  book  VI of  his Metaphysics, Aristotle states 
that, "We are seeking the pr inciples  and  the causes of  the things that  are, and  
obviously of  things qua being."5 Sett ing for th  a division of  the sciences into 
practical,  product ive  and  theoretical ,  he  explains that  while the theoretical  
science o f  mathemat ics  deals with its objects as immovab le  and  as separable  
f rom mat ter ,  "natural  science deals with things which are inseparable  f rom 
ma t t e r  but  are no t  immovable . "  But  "first science deals with things which are 
bo th  separable  and  immovable . "  H e  goes on to assert  the existence of  three  
theoretical  sciences, namely  mathemat ics ,  na tura l  science and  theology,  and  to 
assert  the existence o f  a highest  science dealing with the highest  genus.  This  is 
First Phi losophy,  which is universal  in scope. But  this First Ph i losophy  will be  
the theoretical  science of  theology only if its subject  mat ter ,  separa te  sub- 
stance, can be shown to exist. As Aristotle puts  it there:  " I f  there  is no sub- 
stance o the r  than  those which are f o r m e d  by nature ,  na tura l  science will be the 
first science; but  if  there  is an immovable  substance,  the science o f  this mus t  be 
pr ior  and  mus t  be first phi losophy,  and  universal  in this way, because it is first. 
A n d  it will be long  to this to consider  be ing  qua b e i n g - - b o t h  what  it is and  the 
at t r ibutes  which be long  to it qua being. '6  
In  his c o m m e n t  on this in the Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, Averroes  
explains Aristot le 's  re fe rence  to theology by not ing  that  divine things are those 
in whose defini t ion re fe rence  is made  to God and that  if  there  is a divine 
science, that  science concerns  what  is in a separa te  nature.7 And  he also goes 
on to endorse  Aristotle 's  view that  "if there  were  no o the r  substance than  the 
sensible, there would be no science p r io r  to Natura l  Science." But  "if there  is 
some immobi le  substance,  that  substance is first and  its science is a universal  
5 MetaphysicsVI 1, 1025b2- 3 in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, vol. 
2, edited by Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
6Ibid., VI 1, 1o26a97-32. 
7Averroes Tafsfr md ba'd al-Tabf'ah, ed. Maurice Bouyges, S.J., vol. 2 (Beirut: Dar al-Machreq 
Editeurs [Imprimerie Catholique] x967~), Book H$' c.2, 711-712; Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libri 
XIIII cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem commentariis et epitome in In Aristotelis Opera Cum Averrois Com- 
mentariis, (Venice: Iunctas, 1574), vol. 8, VI c.2, f. 146v H-I. 
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science and  First Phi losophy.  "s Hence ,  Aver roes  clearly holds  to the necessity 
o f  establishing the existence of  substance which is separa te  and  no t  the subject  
o f  the science o f  Physics or  Natura l  Ph i losophy  if there  is to be  a third theoret i -  
cal science, the science which he and  the t radi t ion knew as Metaphysics.  I f  this 
canno t  be  accomplished,  First Ph i losophy  will turn  out  to be Physics or  Natura l  
Philosophy.9 W h e r e  is it established that  there  is such a nature?  As is well- 
known,  Averroes  rejects the app r oach  to Metaphysics of  Avicenna  who takes 
be ing as divided into the necessary and  the possible as a start ing po in t ?  ~ 
Ins tead ,  for  Averroes ,  as for  his master ,  Aristotle, it mus t  be the science of  
Physics or  Natura l  Ph i losophy  that  provides the reason  or basis for  the science 
of  Metaphysics.  
T h e  search for  the es tabl i shment  of  the subject mat te r  o f  Metaphysics,  
then,  takes us to the Physics of  Aristotle and  Averroes '  exposi t ion.  Yet exactly 
how Aristot le 's  a rgumen t s  in books VI I  and  V I I I  o f  his Physics are to be con- 
s t rued is a difficult mat ter .  T h e  a rgumen t s  of  the Physics can be read  as leading 
directly to the f am ous  account  o f  the divine f o u n d  in Metaphysics XII ,  that  is, 
the account  of  the necessity of  the existence o f  an u n m o v e d  move r  who is 
separate  in existence f r o m  the world,  pure ly  actual, ul t imately responsible  for  
the mot ions  of  the heavens  by way o f  final causality, and  there  character ized as 
a substance essentially self- thinking t houg h t  in actuality. H Yet such a read ing  
of  the Physics of  Aristotle is far f r o m  easily established, for  it is no t  un reason-  
able to hold  that  the God o f  the Physics is m u c h  di f ferent  f r o m  the God of  the 
Metaphysics. Aristotle 's  a r g u m e n t s  in his Physics seem to lead, not  to a cause of  
mot ion  which acts by way of  final causality as in the Metaphysics, but  r a the r  to a 
first m o v e r  who is a move r  by way of  mot ion  or  efficient causality. Moreover ,  
as H e r b e r t  Davidson and  o thers  have po in ted  out, insofar  as Aristotle holds in 
the Physics that  the e ternal  mo t ion  of  the heavens  requi res  infinite power  and  
that  infinite power  cannot  be held within a finite body,  Aristotle does prov ide  a 
SAristotle, Metaphysics VI l, l o 2 6 a 2 9 - 3 1 .  Averroes Tafsfr md bard aLTa&^~ah, ed. Bouyges ,  Book 
H$'  c.2, 7 t4; Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libri XIIII, VI c.2, f. 147r A. 
9In his Long Commentary on the Metaphysics Averroes follows Aristot le 's  lead at Metaphysics VI I 11, 
1~  3 - 1 7  in calling Physics or Natura l  Ph i losophy  "secondary  phi losophy."  "It is with a view to 
this tha t  we are t rying to de t e rmi ne  the  na tu re  o f  sensible substances ,  since in a sense  the  s tudy  of  
sensible subs tances  be longs  to physics  or  secondary  ph i losophy  ( ~ g  ( ~ o t ~ g  ~ct~ ~ w ~ c t g  
r for  the  physicist  m u s t  know no t  only abou t  the  mat te r  bu t  also abou t  the  subs tance  
according to the  fo rmula ;  this is even m o r e  essential ,"  Barnes ,  Greek  added.  See Averroes Tafsfr md 
ba~ al-Tab~"~ah, vol.~, Book Z~.' c . 39 ,935 -936 ;  Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libri XIIII, VII c.39, 192 r B-D. 
' ~  Aver roes  the  no t ion  tha t  one  can immedia te ly  begin  with certain concepts  as the  first 
pr inciples  of  metaphys ics  a nd  t he n  p roceed  to their  analysis, tha t  is, as Ibn  Sina does with the  
no t ion  o f  be ing  as necessary  and  possible,  etc., is methodologica l ly  u n s o u n d .  For  a recen t  account  
o f  this doctr ine,  see L. E. G o o d m a n ,  Avicenna (London & New York: Rout ledge,  1992 ), 61ff. 
H Metaphysics  XII 7, l o 7 ~ b 1 - 1 3 ;  XII 9, I o 7 4 a 1 5 - 3 4  9 
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p r o o f  f o r  a n  " i n c o r p o r e a l  f i rs t  m o v e r  b e y o n d  t h e  h e a v e n s .  "'~ N o t e ,  h o w e v e r ,  
t h a t  A r i s t o t l e ' s  c o n c l u s i o n  is m i n i m a l i s t  in  t h a t  h e  d o e s  n o t  e n d e a v o r  in  t h e  
Physics to  g i v e  a m o r e  d e t a i l e d  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  n a t u r e  o f  th i s  " g o d "  o r  
f i r s t  m o v e r ,  s i n c e  Phys i c s  d e a l s  w i t h  e n m a t t e r e d  t h i n g s  a n d  t h e i r  c o n s e q u e n t  
a t t r i b u t e s .  D o e s  th i s  a c c o u n t  sa t i s fy  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f M e t a p h y s i c s V I  1 f o r  t h e  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  M e t a p h y s i c s  as F i r s t  P h i l o s o p h y ?  I t  w o u l d  a p p e a r  to  d o  so, f o r  
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a n  i m m o v a b l e  s u b s t a n c e  is e s t a b l i s h e d  e v e n  i f  i t  is o n l y  u n d e r -  
s t o o d  t h r o u g h  its a c t i v i t y  as a c a u s e  o f  i n f i n i t e  p o w e r  b r i n g i n g  a b o u t  t h e  
e t e r n a l  c i r c u l a r  m o t i o n  o f  t h e  h e a v e n s ,  w h i l e  its o w n  n a t u r e  as a n  i m m a t e r i a l  
e n t i t y  r e m a i n s  s o m e t h i n g  n o t  f a t h o m e d  in  Phys ics .  
A v e r r o e s '  p o s i t i o n  o n  th i s  is s i m i l a r  a n d  i n v o l v e s  t h e  c o n t e n t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
n a t u r e s  o f  t h e  ce l e s t i a l  b o d i e s  a r e  a l t o g e t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h o s e  o f  b o d i e s  o f  
t h e  s u b l u n a r  r e a l m .  W h i l e  s u b l u n a r  b o d i e s  a r e  s u b j e c t  to  d i s s o l u t i o n  b e c a u s e  
t h e y  a r e  c o m p o s i t e s  o f  f o r m  a n d  m a t t e r  s u c h  t h a t  t h e  m a t t e r  o r  s u b s t r a t u m  
ex i s t s  in  v i r t u e  o f  t h e  a c t u a l i t y  o f  its c o r r e l a t i v e  f o r m ,  t h e  s u b s t r a t u m  o f  t h e  
s p h e r e s  is n o t  s u b j e c t  to  d i s s o l u t i o n  b u t  r a t h e r  is e x i s t e n t  in  its o w n  r i g h t  
w i t h o u t  a n y  d e s t r u c t i v e  c o n t r a r i e t y  in  i t?3  I n  c o n t r a s t  to  t h e  m a t t e r  o f  th is  
,2 Herbert A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 325 . 
's "It has also been shown that the celestial body is composed of that which moves and that 
which is moved, and that that which moves does not subsist in that which is moved, nor does it 
inhere in it, but that which moves is completely free from all matter. All this being so, would that I 
knew whether that which is moved, that is the celestial body, is composed of matter and form in 
the manner of the sublunar bodies that are moved in virtue of themselves by a first mover in 
them-- I  refer to the bodies of living beings that are moved by a soul--or  whether the celestial 
body is simple without possessing any force at all. By force I mean a form through which the body 
attains a certain activity, this form being different from the already mentioned motive form which 
does not subsist in the body, that is, different from the form that imparts to the body infinite 
motion mad motivity. 
"We affirm that if it is accepted by us that every force in matter is f ini te--and it makes no 
difference whether this force is active or passive, that is, receptive--and if it is true, as has been 
shown, that the celestial body is capable of infinite movement, it follows necessarily that it is not 
composed of matter and form and that it is simple, that is to say, the celestial body is a simple 
subject for the first mover, which is its form. For everything composed of form and matter is 
necessarily finite in respect to its receptivity, just as it is finite in respect to moving something other 
than itself. Therefore, the peculiar property of that which is moved in virtue of itself, namely, the 
celestial body, is that its mover is not in matter and that that which is moved by this mover is 
simple, not composite." Averroes" De Substantia Orbis. Critical Edition of the Hebrew Text with English 
Translation and Commentary by Arthur Hyman (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Jerusalem: The 
Medieval Academy of America and the Israeli Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1986), l o2 -  
103. Also see his Long Commentary on the Metaphysicr. A verroes Tafs~r md ba~ al- Tab,^ %h, Book .H~i' c. 12, 
T. lo77.1-1o79.1o; Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libri XIIII, VII1 c.12, f. 22or-v E-L. The Latin omits 
Arabic lines l i - 1 2  at the end. See also Averroes Tafsfr md ba'd al-Tab*~ah, Book .H~' c.16, xloz; 
Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libri XIIII, VIII c.x6, f. 225r F. Here Averroes is commenting on Aristotle, 
Metaphysics VIII 6, lo45b22-24. 
In the Long Commentary on theDe Anima he remarks, "It makes no difference whether you hold that 
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sublunar  world, as Davidson puts  it, "The  heavens must  instead be cons t rued  
as a body of  a complete ly  dif ferent  type, consisting in the association of  a 
simple matter-like substratum in motion,  and an independen t ly  existing imma- 
terial fo rm moving the substratum. The  matter-l ike substratum exists necessar- 
ily by virtue of itself, and the fo rm is a source of  infinite power  whereby  the 
substra tum moves eternally."~4 On this account  of  the teaching of  Averroes,  
then,  the relat ionship of  the substratum of  the sphere  and the incorporeal  
fo rm moving it is one  o f  an association like tbat  o f  a soul with a body albeit with 
the impor tan t  di f ference that this celestial soul is not  in the celestial body as a 
sublunar  soul is in a sublunar  body.~5 But  jus t  what  is the na ture  of  this 
the  u l t imate  actuality ge ne ra t e d  in any  individual  is the  subject  for  tha t  intellect, n a m e l y  [the 
actuality] t h r o u g h  which  the  Material  Intel lect  is j o i ned  [to individuals] a n d  [that] it is f r om this as 
if  a f o rm  separable  f r o m  its subject  with which  it is conjoined,  if there  is such  a thing,  or  w h e t h e r  
you  ho ld  tha t  this actuali ty is one  o f  the  powers  o f  the  soul  or  [one] o f  the  powers  o f  the  body,  [still] 
the  same impossibil i ty follows. 
~For this reason one  should  ho ld  the  op in ion  that,  if  there  are  some  living th ings  whose  first 
actuali ty is a subs tance  separa te  f r om its subjects,  as is t h o u g h t  c o n c e r n i n g  the  celestial bodies,  it is 
impossible  tha t  t he re  be f o u n d  m o r e  than  one  individual  f rom one  species o f  these.  For,  i f  f r om 
these,  namely ,  f rom the  same  species, we find m o r e  t han  one  individual,  for  instance,  with regard  
to a body  move d  by the  same mover ,  t he n  the  be ing  o f  these [others] would  be useless  a n d  
super f luous ,  s ince the  mo t ion  o f  these [bodies] would  be owing to an  in ten t ion  which  is the  same 
in n u m b e r . "  My t ransla t ion f rom Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima 
Libros, ed. F. S tuar t  Crawford  (Cambridge 1953) III c. 5, 4 o 3 - 4 o 4  . He rea f t e r  cited as LCDA (Long 
Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle). T h e  Arabic original  o f  this work  is no t  extant ,  a l t hough  
the re  are some  f r agmen t s .  See A. Ben C h a h i d a  in "Iktishfif al-nas..s al- 'arabf l i - ahamm ajz~' al-sharh. 
al-kabfr li-kitdb al-nafs t a ' l f fAbi  al-Walfd ibn Rushd , "  ALHaydt al-Thaqdfiyya 35 (1985) 14-48-  
,4 Davidson,  3~5 . 
'~ In  a r ecen t  article David Twe t t en  summa r i z e d  this doctr ine as follows: 
"The  Pkysics, as Aver roes  reads  it, concludes  to no  p r i m e  mover  beyond  tha t  which,  t oge the r  with 
the  celestial body,  f o rms  a se l f -moved whole.  In  o the r  words,  the  Physics's h ighes t  m o v e r  is no th ing  
o the r  than  the  immed ia t e  mover  o f  the  first heaven ,  the  first celestial soul. Even the  infinitely 
powerfu l  p r ime  move r  o f  Physics 8.1o in no  way surpasses  the  move r  which  chap te r  6 had  al ready 
p r o v e d - - a l t h o u g h  less proper ly  t ha n  chap te r  l o - - t o  be ent irely u n m o v e d ,  separate ,  a n d  immate -  
riM. For  Averroes ,  then ,  there  is no  t ransi t ion in the  Physics f rom a celestial soul to a pr ior  cause.  
Indeed ,  the  t e rms  'intellect' or  ' separate  intellect'  are  nowhe re  used  there ."  David B. Twet ten ,  
"Averroes  on  the  Pr ime Mover Proved in the  Physics," Viator. Medieval and Renaissance Studies 26 
(1995): lo  7 -  a34. See 13 ~. Twet ten ' s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  this  'celestial soul '  is in line with Davidson ' s  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  the  form of  the  first sphere ,  the  eternal  move r  which  Davidson character izes as 
" i n d e p e n d e n t  of, a l t hough  associated with,  the  subs t r a tum of  the  sphere . "  Davidson,  326. But  
Twe t t en  p u t s  special e mpha s i s  on  the  ques t ion  o f  the  na tu r e  o f  this "celestial soul '  or  "associated 
mover '  as it can be unde r s t ood  in Physics. He  ques t ions  whe the r  this move r  could  reasonably  be 
identif ied with any  o f  the  separa te  intellects func t ion ing  as final causes  in the  Metaphysics and  mos t  
impor tan t ly  w h e t h e r  this invest igat ion in the  science o f  Physics in fact is able to conc lude  to the  
exis tence o f  God for Averroes .  As he  poses this ques t ion ,  "If the  Physics d e m o n s t r a t e s  God 's  
existence,  so tha t  GOd is bu t  the  first celestial 'soul, '  the  immedia te  efficient move r  o f  the  primum 
mob//e, t hen  how can  the  Metaphysics conclude  tha t  God is an  exclusively final c a u s e ? . . .  Aver roes ' s  
exposi t ion o f  the  Physics offers no  s a t i s f a c t o r y . . ,  g r o u n d s  for a dist inct ion between God and  the 
celestial soul, or  for  a dist inct ion between a celestial soul  and  any  separa te  intellect." Twet ten ,  134. 
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a s s o c i a t i o n ?  H o w  d o e s  t h i s  a s s o c i a t i o n  c a u s e  t h e  c e l e s t i a l  b o d y  to  m o v e ?  A n d  
j u s t  w h a t  is t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h i s  s e p a r a t e  i m m a t e r i a l  f o r m ?  T h e  s c i e n c e  o f  t h e  
s o u l  o r  P s y c h o l o g y ,  a b r a n c h  o f  P h y s i c s ,  is w h e r e  w e  m u s t  t u r n  f o r  a n s w e r s  t o  
t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s .  
2 .  
In the open ing  lines o f  his de Anima, Aristotle makes  the following s ta tement :  
H o l d i n g  as we d o  tha t ,  whi le  k n o w l e d g e  o f  any  k i n d  is a t h i n g  to b e  h o n o u r e d  a n d  pr ized ,  
o n e  k i n d  o f  it may,  e i t h e r  by r e a s o n  o f  its g r e a t e r  exac tness  o r  o f  a h i g h e r  d ign i ty  a n d  
g r e a t e r  w o n d e r f u l n e s s  in  its objects ,  be  m o r e  h o n o u r a b l e  a n d  p rec ious  t h a n  a n o t h e r ,  o n  
b o t h  accoun t s  we s h o u l d  n a t u r a l l y  be  led to p lace  in  the  f r o n t  r a n k  t he  s tudy  o f  the  soul. 
T h e  k n o w l e d g e  o f  the  soul  a d m i t t e d l y  c o n t r i b u t e s  grea t ly  to the  a d v a n c e  o f  t r u t h  in  
gene ra l ,  and ,  above  all, to o u r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  N a t u r e ,  fo r  the  soul  is in  some  sense  the  
p r i n c i p l e  o f  a n i m a l  l i fe?  6 
For  Aver roes  in his Long Commentary on theDeAnima of Aristotle,'7 due  to the no- 
bility o f  the subject  and  the demons t ra t ive  power  of  Psychology or the science of  
the soul, this science "surpasses o ther  sciences, except  for  divine science, is < a n d  
so>  we mus t  hold  that  the science of  the soul comes  before  the o the r  sciences; 
and  for  this reason we p laced  it in a posit ion of  pr iori ty a m o n g  all subjects o f  
inquiry."19 But  there  is m u c h  m o r e  to the value of  Psychology for  Averroes.  
This interesting question is beyond the scope of the present article but it appears that  the answer 
involves the special nature of conceptualizadon by intellect (to4.awwur bi-l-*aql) as it occurs in the 
celestial entities. See below 27-28, and the article cited in note 44- 
~6 de Anima I l, 4o2aa-7  Barnes. 
aTA later thinker, Thomas Aquinas, who seems to have had the Long Commentary on the De 
Anima by Averroes open on his desk when composing his own Sentencia Libri De Anima, remarks that  
Aristode's statement that psychology "contributes greatly to the advance of truth in general" is 
because in First Philosophy or Metaphysics "we are able to come to knowledge of divine things and 
of the highest causes only in virtue of what we are able to grasp first from the power of intellect." It 
contributes as well, Aquinas writes, to moral philosophy since "we cannot  have a complete grasp of 
moral science unless we know the powers of the soul, and it is consequent upon this that the 
Philosopher in the Ethics attributed any given virtues to the diverse potencies of the soul." Sentencia 
Libri De Anima in Opera Omnia Iussi Leonis XIII  P.M. Edita (Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris: Li- 
brairie PhilosophiqueJ.  Vrin, 1984) 5b-6a.  These remarks by Aquinas about the power of intel- 
lect and "moral science" result from his study of the corresponding comments of Averroes in the 
latter's Long Commentary on the De Anima. Also see Themistius, In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Para- 
phrasis, ed. R. Heinze (Berlin 1899 ) [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, vol. V] 1.24-2.6; An Arabic 
Translation of Themistius' Commentary on Aristotle'sDe Anima, edited by M. C. Lyons (Columbia, South 
Carolina, and Oxford, England, 1973) , 1.1o-3.8; Latin: Themistius. Commentairesurle Trait~de l'Ame 
d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, G. Verbeke, ed. (Paris & Louvain, 1957) 2-3;  and 
Themistius, On Aristotle's On the Soul, tr. Robert B. Todd (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
i996), 15-16. The posidon of Aquinas is obvious enough, for our natural intellectual powers 
enable us ultimately to come to an understanding of God, according to him. 
~SThat is, metaphysics. 
,9 LCDA, I c. a, 4. My translation. 
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You should be aware that the science of  the soul {5} is found to be helpful to the other 
sciences in three ways. First, inasmuch as it is part of  that science, *~ indeed the noblest 
of  its par t s - -and  this is the relationship it has to natural science. For living things are 
the noblest of  generable and corruptible bodies, but  the soul is nobler than all <else> 
in living things. Secondly, because it supplies more principles for more sciences, for 
example, for moral science--that  is, < the  science> of  governing states--and for divine 
science. For from this science moral science gets the ultimate end of  human beings 
considered as human beings and the knowledge of  what their substance is. The meta- 
physician ~ gets from it the substance of  his subject. For here <in the science of  the 
soul> it will be explained that the separate forms are intelligences, and also many other 
things concerning the knowledge of  states consequent upon intelligence considered as 
intelligence and intellect. And thirdly, it is generally helpful and enables the acquisition 
of  confirmation regarding first principles, since from <this science> we acquire knowl- 
edge of  the first causes of  propositions, and knowledge of  anything through its cause is 
more certain than <knowledge> only of  its own being. 22 
T h u s ,  Psycho logy  he lps  us u n d e r s t a n d  the  p o w e r  o f  soul  in living things.  I t  
also suppl ies  pr inc ip les  for  several sciences,  f o r  mora l  science which  is a b r a n c h  
o f  politics by m a k i n g  k n o w n  h u m a n  n a t u r e  a n d  its end ,  a n d  also fo r  M e t a p h y s -  
ics fo r  wh ich  it p rov ides  an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  the n a t u r e  o f  intel lect  a n d  sepa-  
rate intel l igence.  A n d ,  third,  Psycho logy  p rov ides  an  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  h u m a n  
epis temologica l  powers  and  func t ions .  
For  Aver roes ,  it is P s y c h o l o g y  which  is respons ib le  fo r  supp ly ing  key pr inc i -  
ples fo r  the  es tab l i shment  o f  the  science o f  Metaphysics ,  by  es tabl ishing in a 
way  d i f f e r en t  f r o m  tha t  o f  Physics tha t  t he re  exist separa te  f o r m s  and  tha t  
these separa te ly  exis t ing f o r m s  are  intel lectual  in na ture .  I t  also is able to 
con t r i bu t e  to an  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  the  na tu r e s  o f  the  celestial bodies  a n d  their  
mot ions .  W h a t  A v e r r o e s  has in m i n d  is the  science o f  Psycho logy ' s  establish- 
m e n t  o f  the  exis tence o f  the  A g e n t  In te l lec t  a n d  o f  the  exis tence o f  the  Mate-  
rial In te l lec t  as separa te ly  exis t ing substances .  
The Material Intellect is defined as that which is in potency all the intentions of  
universal material forms and is not any of  the beings in act before it thinks [any of  
them]. Since that is the definition of  the Material Intellect, it is evident that in its own 
case it differs from prime matter in this respect: it is in potency all the intentions {388} 
of  the universal material forms, while prime matter is in potency all those sensibles 
forms, not something which knows or discerns. And the reason why that nature is 
something which discerns and knows [distinguens et cognoscens] while prime matter nei- 
ther thinks nor  discerns, is because prime matter receives diverse forms, namely individ- 
ual and particular forms, while this [nature] receives universal forms. From this it is 
~~ is, natural science. 
~1 Divinus, the masculine of the adjective, surely reflects the Arabic al-ildhfprobably for al-'ilm 
al-ildhf*, "divine science." The Latin translator seems to have misunderstood al-ildhf as "theolo- 
gian" or "metaphysician," as I have chosen to render it here. 
~2 LCDA, I c.~, 4-5. My translation. 
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apparent  that that nature is not  a this, nor  a body nor  a power in a body. For, if this 
were so, then it would receive forms according to their diversity and particularity; and 
if this were so, then the forms existing in it would be intelligible in potency, and thus it 
would not  discern the nature of the forms inasmuch as they are forms,~ as it is a 
disposition in relation to individual forms, be they spiritual or corporeal. For this 
reason, if that nature which is called the intellect receives forms, it must receive forms 
by another mode of reception than that by which those matters receive the forms whose 
determination by matter is the determination of prime matter in them. And for this 
reason it is not necessary that it be of the genus of those matters in which the form is 
enclosed, nor  that it be prime matter itself. Since, if this were so, then the reception in 
these would be of the same genus; for the diversity of the received nature causes the 
diversity of the nature  of the recipient. This, therefore, moves Aristotle to set forth this 
nature which is other than the nature of matter, other than the nature of form, and 
other than the nature of the composite.~4 
T h e  Mater ia l  I n t e l l ec t  has a ce r t a in  p o t e n c y  in  it insofa r  as it is able  to have in  it 
the in te l l ig ib le  f o rms  of  ma te r i a l  th ings  o f  the wor ld  in  an  i m m a t e r i a l  way such 
tha t  w h a t  we call k n o w l e d g e  of  the  un ive r sa l  is p r e s e n t  in  the  intel lect .  W h e n  a 
f o r m  is in  act in  a p a r t i c u l a r  ma te r i a l  t h i n g  in  the  physical  world ,  it exists in  a 
ma te r i a l  way as a pa r t i cu l a r  a n d  as such  it is in te l l ig ible  on ly  in  po tency .  T h a t  
is, for  it to be  in te l l ig ib le  in  act, it n eeds  an  in te l lec t  to g rasp  it as inte l l igible ,  it 
has to come  to exist in  an  in te l lec t  as in te l l ig ib le  in accord  with the  n a t u r e  of  
tha t  inte l lect .  T h e  n e e d  for  an  immate r i a l  r e c e p t i o n  o f  un ive r sa l  fo rms  in  
k n o w i n g  r e q u i r e s  tha t  wha t  receives t h e m  be a separa te  in te l lec t  a n d  yet  be  
s o m e t h i n g  which  is capab le  o f  r e c e p t i o n ,  tha t  is, have  a p o t e n c y  for  the recep-  
t ion  of  i m m a t e r i a l  fo rms .  T h e s e  in te l l ig ib les  in  act in the separa te  Mater ia l  
I n t e l l ec t  are the  r e fe ren t s  for  the  n o t i o n s  expressed  by us in  un ive r sa l  p ropos i -  
t ions  of  sciencey5 
Aver roes '  asser t ion  of  the  necess i ty  of  the  ex is tence  of  this separa te  Mater ia l  
In te l l ec t  is a pos i t ion  he  came to late in  life af ter  l o n g  years  of  s t rugg le  over  the 
issue o f  the  intel lect .  ~6 His  m a t u r e  a c c o u n t  follows in  pa r t  f r o m  two cen t ra l  
ph i lo soph ica l  p r o p o s i t i o n s  r e su l t i ng  f r o m  his s tudy  o f  the t rad i t ion .  First ,  as we 
have seen  above,  if the r e cep t i on  of  an  in te l l ig ib le  in  act were  to come  a b o u t  as a 
r e c e p t i o n  in to  a this or  pa r t i cu l a r  ind iv idua l ,  w h a t  is rece ived  w o u l d  be some-  
t h i n g  else, tha t  is, s o m e t h i n g  which  is n o t  an  in te l l ig ib le  in  act  b u t  r a t h e r  an  
*sit would not grasp the natures of the forms in a way which would be consonant with 
scientific knowledge; that is, it would not be able to grasp them qua universal. 
*4LCDA, III c.5, 387-388. My translation. 
25This is one of the topics of discussion in Richard C. Taylor, "Remarks on Cogitatio in 
Averroes' Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros," forthcoming in Averroes and the 
Aristotelian Tradition: Sources, Constitution and Reception of the Philosophy of lbn Rushd (x 9 2 6 -  9 r 98),Jan 
A. Aertsen and Gerhard Endress, eds. (Cologne, 1998 ). 
~6Davidson gives an account of the many developments in Averroes' thought on the Material 
Intellect as he moved toward his mature teaching in that topic. See Davidson, 258-~98. 
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i n t e l l i g i b l e  in  p o t e n c y .  B u t  i n  o r d e r  to  u n d e r s t a n d ,  t h a t  is, to  h a v e  t h e  i n t e l l i g i b l e  
in  ac t  in  it,  t h e  M a t e r i a l  I n t e l l e c t  c a n n o t  b e  a b o d y  o r  a p o w e r  in  a b o d y  s i n c e  t h a t  
w o u l d  m a k e  i t  a this.27 S e c o n d l y ,  i f  t h e  i n t e l l i g i b l e  in  ac t  w e r e  in  m a n y  in t e l l e c t s ,  
t h e  i n t e l l i g i b l e  in  a c t w o u l d  b e  m a n y  i n t e l l i g i b l e s  in  act ,  n o t  o n e ;  b u t  t h e  i n t e l l i g i -  
b l e  in  ac t  m u s t  b e  o n e  so t h a t  t h e r e  is a s i n g l e  i n t e l l i g i b l e  w h i c h  is c o m m o n  
r e f e r e n t  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  f o r m i n g  p r o p o s i t i o n s  o f  s c i e n c e ,  so  t h a t  s c i e n c e  is pos s i -  
b le .  28 A p l u r a l i t y  o f  m a t e r i a l  i n t e l l e c t s ,  t h e n ,  is i m p o s s i b l e .  T h e  m a t e r i a l  i n t e l l e c t  
h a s  to  ex i s t  as a s i ng l e ,  s e p a r a t e  i m m a t e r i a l  b e i n g  o f  an  i n t e l l e c t u a l  sor t ,  n o t  as 
s o m e  p a r t i c u l a r  m a t e r i a l  i n d i v i d u a l .  T h i s  s i n g l e  m a t e r i a l  i n t e l l e c t  is s h a r e d  by  al l  
h u m a n  b e i n g s  a n d  is t h a t  in  v i r t u e  o f  w h i c h  t h e y  a r e  c a l l e d  ra t ional .~9 
I n  h is  c o m m e n t  to  t e x t  5 in  B o o k  I I I  o f  t h e  De Anima,  A v e r r o e s  r e m a r k s  
t h a t  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i n t o  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  i n t e l l e c t  y i e l d s  a n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  
t h e  m a t e r i a l  i n t e l l e c t  as i n t e l l e c t  a n d  y e t  as h a v i n g  a r e c e p t i v e  p o t e n c y  w i t h i n  it. 
E x p l a i n i n g  h is  d o c t r i n e  by  a n a l o g y ,  h e  s t a t e s  t h a t  j u s t  
as sensible be ing  is d ivided into fo rm and  mat ter ,  intel l igible be ing  must  be d iv ided into 
things similar  to these  two, name ly  into  someth ing  similar to fo rm and  into  some th ing  
similar to matter .  This  is [something] necessarily p resen t  in every  separate  inte l l igence 
~7 The sense in which the Material Intellect is not 'a this' has to do with the fact that it is not a 
member of a species properly speaking, since it is its own species. This is discussed in my article 
cited in note 99 . 
28 "That way we posited the essence of the Material Intellect solves all the questions resulting 
from our holding that the intellect is one and many. For, if the thing understood in me and in you 
were one in every way, it would happen, that when I would know some intelligible, you would also 
know it, and many other impossible things. If we assert it to be many, then it would happen that 
the thing thought in me and in you would be one in species and two in individual [number]. In this 
way the thing understood will have a thing understood and so it proceeds into infinity. Thus, it will 
be impossible for a student to learn from a teacher unless the knowledge which is in the teacher is 
a power generating and creating the knowledge which is in the student, in the way in which one 
fire generates another {412} fire similar to it in species, which is impossible. That what is known is 
the same in the teacher and the student in this way caused Plato to believe that learning is 
recollection. Since, then, we asserted that the intelligible thing which is in me and in you is many in 
subject insofar as it is true, namely the forms of the imagination, and one in the subject through 
which it is a being of the intellect (namely the Material Intellect), those questions are completely 
resolved." LCDA, III c.5, 411-412. My translation. This text of Averroes is derivative upon 
Themistius, Heinze, IO4.:--14; Lyons, 189.2-15; Verbeke, ~34-236; and Todd, tr., 129. Aver- 
roes also found this infinite regress argument in Ibn B~ijjah's Risdlatlttisdl al-~aql bi-l-insdn, "Treatise 
on the Conjoining of the Intellect with Man." See Miguel Asin Palacios, "Tratado de Avempace 
sobre la Uni tn  del intelecto con el Hombre," AI-Andalus 7 (1949): 1-47, section 8, Arabic Text 14- 
15, Spanish translation, 3~-33 . Also see Vincent Laguard~re. "L'Epitre d'Ibn B~ijja sur la conjunc- 
tion de l'intellect avec l'esprit humain," Revue des Etudes Islamiques 49 (198 x ): 175-196; see 187, 
~9 These two important philosophical propositions are discussed with reference to the thought 
of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas and their critique of Averroes by Lawrence Dewan, O.P., 
in "St. Albert, St. Thomas, and Knowledge," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 7 ~ (1995) : 12 l -  
135' These propositions and their importance for the epistemology of Averroes are discussed in my 
article, "Remarks on Averroes's Epistemology and its Critique by Aquinas," forthcoming in Thomistic 
Papers VII. Medieval Masters: Essays in Memory of Msgnr. E.A. Synan, R.E. Houser, ed. (Houston, 1998). 
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which thinks some th ing  else. A n d  if  not,  t hen  there  would  be no  mul t ip l ic i ty  {41o} in 
separa te  forms.  A n d  it was a l ready exp la ined  in first ph i losophy  that  there  is no fo rm 
absolutely f ree  o f  po tency  excep t  the First F o r m  which unders tands  n o t h i n g  outs ide  
I t s e l f Y  Its essence is Its quiddi ty  (essentia eius est quiditas eius). O t h e r  forms,  however ,  are 
in some way d i f fe ren t  in quiddi ty  and  essence.3'  I f  it were  no t  for  this genus  o f  beings  
which we have come  to know in the science o f  the soul, we could  no t  unde r s t and  
mult ipl ic i ty  in separate  things, to the ex ten t  that, unless we know here  the na tu re  o f  the 
intellect,  we canno t  know that  the separa te  m o v i n g  powers  o u g h t  to be intellects.~ 2 
T h a t  is, th i s  d i v i s i o n  in  i n t e l l e c t u a l  e n t i t i e s  o f  w h a t  is a n a l o g o u s  to  f o r m  a n d  o f  
w h a t  is a n a l o g o u s  to  m a t t e r ,  o r  o f  ac t  a n d  p o t e n c y ,  is d i s c o v e r e d  in  P s y c h o l o g y .  
I t  is t h e n  u s e d  as a p r i n c i p l e  in  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h e  n a t u r e s  o f  all  t h e  i m m a t e r i a l  
i n t e l l i g e n c e s .  P o t e n c y  m u s t  b e  p r e s e n t  in  a n y  s e p a r a t e  i n t e l l i g e n c e  w h i c h  is 
c a p a b l e  o f  k n o w i n g  a n y t h i n g  o u t s i d e  i tself .  F o r  i n s o f a r  as i t  is a n  i n t e l l i g e n c e  
w i t h  i t s e l f  as its o b j e c t ,  i t  n e e d  h a v e  n o  p o t e n c y .  B u t  i n s o f a r  as i t  is in  p o t e n c y  
f o r  k n o w i n g  s o m e t h i n g  o t h e r  t h a n  its o w n  e s s e n c e  o r  n a t u r e ,  n a m e l y  t h e  F i r s t  
C a u s e  w h i c h  is t h e  f ina l  c a u s e  o f  all ,  i t  m u s t  h a v e  a c e r t a i n  " m a t e r i a l i t y "  o r  
p o t e n c y  f o r  r e c e i v i n g  a f o r m  o t h e r  t h a n  its o w n  f r o m  o u t s i d e  i t s e l f  as i t  s t r i ves  
to  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  F i r s t  C a u s e .  W h i l e  e s s e n t i a l l y  ac t i ve  w i t h o u t  p o t e n t i a l i t y  f o r  
a n y  c h a n g e  w i t h i n  t h e m ,  t h e  i m m a t e r i a l  i n t e l l i g e n c e s  m u s t  n e v e r t h e l e s s  b e  in  a 
r e l a t i o n  o f  k n o w i n g  vis $ vis  t h e  F i r s t  C a u s e .  As  s u c h ,  f o r  t h e m  t h e r e  is less  
t h a n  c o m p l e t e  a n d  p e r f e c t  u n i t y  o f  e s s e n c e  a n d  q u i d d i t y .  
. 
T h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  s e p a r a t e  e n t i t y  in  N a t u r a l  P h i l o s o p h y  o r  Phys i c s  a l l o w e d  
f o r  t h e  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  s c i e n c e  o f  M e t a p h y s i c s .  N o w  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  
s~ "First Form" is God for Averroes. The separate substances or intelligences are distin- 
guished from one another in virtue of their potency for knowledge, a certain "materiality" found 
in each which is sufficient to allow their distinction from one another and to make reasonable the 
assertion that there is a multiplicity of separate substances, according to Averroes. This potency 
for knowledge, in particular, for knowledge of God, is the active power for intellectual understand- 
ing present in each separate immaterial substance other than God. Also see n. 48. 
31 God alone is pure actuality, while other separate intellects have some potency in them. For 
Averroes the First is pure actuality, fa-inna-hu fHun mah(lun, Averroes Tars# md ba~ al-Tabf~ah, ed. 
Maurice Bouyges, s.J., vols. 3 -4  (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1948), Book Lhm c.37, 1599. 7. 
(The Latin translation omits this phrase. Cf. Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libri XIIII, XII c.37, f.319 v G- 
H.) While the precise meaning of the phrase, essentia eius est quiditas eius, cannot be determined in a 
definitive way without consultation of the original Arabic now lost, one can conjecture that the sense 
seems to be that the very self (dhdti-hi*?) of God is fully and completely identical with his essential 
nature or what he is (mdhiyati-hi*?). God is the First Form in the hierarchy of separate intelligences as 
well as "the intelligence moving the outermost sphere" of the universe. Davidson, 956. 
~LCDA, III c.5, 4o9-41o. My translation. In this, then, lies the reason why the study of the 
soul is more worthy and more noble than other studies and why it should precede others: we 
understand the nature of intellect first through understanding the nature of intellect present in 
ourselves and only when something of that understanding has been achieved can there be any 
understanding of intellect in higher beings. 
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the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  s e p a r a t e  in t e l l ec t  in P s y c h o l o g y  a l lows fo r  the  c onc l u s i on  t h a t  
s e p a r a t e  in t e l l ec t  is i m m a t e r i a l  ac tua l i t y  a n d  s e p a r a t e  f r o m  t h e  b o d y  in exis-  
tence.33 I t  f u r t h e r  a l lows fo r  t he  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  h o w  p o t e n c y  can  be  p r e s e n t  
in a n  i m m a t e r i a l  in te l l ec t .  B u t  d o e s  it a lso a l low us to c o n c l u d e  t h a t  " the  
s e p a r a t e  m o v i n g  p o w e r s "  f r o m  the  Physics " o u g h t  to be  in te l l ec t s , "  as A v e r r o e s  
r e m a r k s  in t h e  p a s s a g e  f r o m  De Anima  I I I  c. 5 ? "Averroes  c e r t a i n l y  s e e m s  to 
t h i n k  so. 
This was unknown to many modern  thinkers to the extent  that they denied what 
Aristotle says in the eleventh book of the First Philosophy, that  the separate forms 
moving the bodies must  be in accord with the number  of  celestial bodies.34 To this 
extent  knowledge of  the soul is necessary for knowledge of First Philosophy.~5 And  that 
receptive intellect must  think the intellect which is in act. For, while it thinks material  
forms, it is more befitt ing that  it think immaterial  forms. And  what  it thinks among 
separate forms, for example,  the Agent  Intellect, does not  impede it f rom thinking 
material  forms.~ 6 
W h a t  P s y c h o l o g y  d o e s  by  m e a n s  o f  t he  d i s cove ry  o f  the  s e p a r a t e  a g e n t  a n d  
m a t e r i a l  in te l l ec t s  is to s u p p l y  M e t a p h y s i c s  wi th  i m p o r t a n t  p r i n c i p l e s  fo r  t he  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t he  c o n c l u s i o n s  o f  N a t u r a l  P h i l o s o p h y .  N o w  the  m o v e r s  o f  
t he  h e a v e n s ,  t he  s e p a r a t e  i n t e l l e c tua l  souls  o r  in te l l ec t s ,  c an  b e  u n d e r s t o o d  as  
d i f f e r e n t  in  e s s ence  f r o m  o n e  a n o t h e r  in  v i r t u e  o f  d i f f e r e n c e s  in t h e i r  levels  o f  
ac tua l i t y  a n d  p o t e n c y ,  s o m e t h i n g  r e f l e c t e d  in the  d i f f e r e n t  m o v e m e n t s  t hey  
cause  in  t he  heavens .  O n l y  the  "F i r s t  F o r m "  o r  G o d  is to be  u n d e r s t o o d  as p u r e  
i n t e l l e c tua l  ac tua l i t y  c o m p l e t e l y  f r ee  o f  potency.37 
S u c h  is the  p o s i t i o n  o f  A v e r r o e s  in his  Long Commentary on the Metaphysics o f  
A r i s t o t l e  as well .  T h e r e  he  r e m a r k s :  
From this it is fully clear that these celestial bodies are alive and that among the powers 
of soul they have only intellect and the power of  desire, i.e. [intellect] which causes 
motion in place. This  is perhaps  evident  from what I say, for it has been explained in 
the eighth book of  the Physics that  what causes motion belonging to the celestial bodies 
is not  in mat ter  and is a separate form. And  it was explained in the De Anima that the 
separate forms are intellect. So, consequently, this mover is an intellect and is a mover 
insofar as it is an agent  of  motion and insofar as it is the end of  motion.38 
ss See Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics. A Translation with Introduction of lbn Rushd's Commentary on Aristotle's 
Metaphysics, Book Lam (Leiden: E.J.Brill, t984) , by Charles Genequand, introduction, 36. 
S4Metaphysics XII 8, 1o73a96-38. 
35Cf. above, ~2-23 and n. 21. 
36LCDA, I l l  c. 5, 4xo. My translation. 
37 See notes 3 ~ and 31. 
58 Averroes Tafsir md bald al-Taln"~ah, Book L~m c. 36, 1593-4- My translation. Cf. Latin, Aristotelis 
Metaphysicorum Libri XIIII, XII c.36, f. 318rv F-G. Cf. Genequand, 149: "From that, it appears in all 
clarity that celestial bodies have souls and that of the powers of the soul, they have only the 
intellect and the faculty of desire, I mean (the faculty) that imparts to them local motion. This 
appears from what I say: it has been explained in the eighth book of the Physics that the mover of 
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N o w  we n e e d  to n o t e  tha t  th is  c o n c l u s i o n  does  n o t  s t r ic t ly  fo l low f r o m  w h a t  
has  b e e n  set  f o r t h  h e r e .  As  C h a r l e s  G e n e q u a n d  p o i n t s  o u t  in t he  i n t r o d u c t i o n  
to his  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  A v e r r o e s '  c o m m e n t a r y  o n  A r i s t o t l e ' s  B o o k  L a m b d a  o f  t he  
Metaphysics, " C o m b i n i n g  i n d i c a t i o n s  d r a w n  f r o m  the  e i g h t h  b o o k  o f  t he  Physics 
a n d  the  t h i r d  o f  t he  de Anima, I b n  R u s h d  t r ies  to p r o v e  t h a t  the  f i rs t  m o v e r  is 
i t se l f  an  in te l lec t .  T h e  a r g u m e n t , "  c o n t i n u e s  G e n e q u a n d ,  "is n o t  q u i t e  c o n v i n c -  
i n g  b e c a u s e  w h a t  t he  de Anima shows  is t h a t  t he  in t e l l ec t  is a s e p a r a t e  f o r m ,  n o t  
t h a t  a n y  s e p a r a t e  f o r m  is an  in t e l l ec t  as I b n  R u s h d  says (] 593 ,14-1594 ,3 ) . "~9  
T h a t  is to say, t he  sy l log i sm is n o t  c o m p l e t e  a c c o r d i n g  to G e n e q u a n d  w h o  
be l i eves  t he  a r g u m e n t  fails. T h a t  the  m o v e r  is a s e p a r a t e l y  ex i s t i ng  i m m a t e r i a l  
ac tua l i t y  d o e s  n o t  m e a n  w i t h o u t  f u r t h e r  e x p l a n a t i o n  t ha t  i t  m u s t  b e  an  in te l -  
lect ,  as h a p p e n s  in t he  a r g u m e n t  o f  the  De Anima w h e r e  i n s t e a d  the  a r g u m e n t  
m o v e s  f r o m  i n t e l l e c t u a l  o p e r a t i o n s  to t he  neces s i t y  o f  i n t e l l ec t  b e i n g  s e p a r a t e .  
T h i s  c o n c l u s i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  can  be  d r a w n  o n  the  basis  o f  an  a d d i t i o n a l  p r e m i s e  
o r  a s s u m p t i o n .  W h e r e  a re  we to f i nd  the  n e e d e d  p r i n c i p l e ?  
T h e  r e d u c t i o n  o f  o % o ~  to f o r m  a n d  ac tua l i t y  in Metaphysics Ze ta  a n d  E ta  
m a k e s  i t  c l ea r  t ha t  b e i n g  is t he  a c t u a l i t y  o f  f o r m  a n d  in t e l l i g ib i l i t y  fo r  Ar i s t o t l e  
a n d  fo r  Averroes.4O C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t he  a r g u m e n t  o f  t he  Physics to a s e p a r a t e  
a s soc i a t ed  m o v e r  as .an i m m a t e r i a l  a c tua l i t y  is an  a r g u m e n t  to a b e i n g  w h o s e  
n a t u r e  is f o r m .  As  such ,  this  i m m a t e r i a l  ac tua l i ty  is a b e i n g  a n d  an  in te l l ig ib le  
o b j e c t  o r  form.a1 Now,  in t he  case o f  i m m a t e r i a l  i n t e l l i g ib l e  objec ts ,  the  De 
Anima has  s h o w n  fo r  A v e r r o e s  t h a t  a s e p a r a t e  in te l l ig ib le  ob jec t ,  i n s o f a r  as i t  is 
a c tua l l y  in te l l ig ib le ,  m u s t  exis t  in  an  in te l lec t .  H e n c e ,  i t  is n o t  e n o u g h  to con-  
c l u d e  t ha t  t h e r e  exists  a s e p a r a t e  in t e l l ig ib le  objec t ;  r a t h e r ,  i t  m u s t  be  con-  
c l u d e d  t h a t  a n  in t e l l ig ib le  f o r m  e x i s t i n g  as a s e p a r a t e  ac tua l i t y  m u s t  in  its v e r y  
n a t u r e  be  e x i s t e n t  in an  in te l lec t .  T h i s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  is c o n f i r m e d  in t h e  
c o m m e n t a r y  o n  b o o k  L a m b d a  o f  t he  Metaphysics w h e r e  A v e r r o e s  r e m a r k s :  
Since conceptualization by intellect, which is an activity of  intellect, is the intellect itself 
and the intellect is the intelligible itself according to what has been explained in the De 
these celestial bodies is without matter and a separate form, and in the De Anima that the separate 
forms are intellect. It follows that this mover is an intellect and that it is a mover insofar as it is the 
agent of motion and the end of motion." 
s9 Genequand, introduction, 36. 
40 In these books Aristotle traces the actuality of substance to form. The account of an existing 
thing which is given by its differences is one of its form and actuality. MetaphysicsVIII 2, lo43al 9-  
1. The cause of actuality in a composite thing is the form. See Averroes Tafsfr md bald al-Tab*"*ah, 
Book H.$' c.7, lO55; Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libri XIIII, VIII c.7, f. z 15 v K. And forms which are 
not actualities of matter have being in their own right, not dependent upon anything else. These 
are the separate intelligences which are linked with the celestial bodies as their 'souls.' It is in this 
way that Averroes interprets Metaphysics VII I 6, 1 o45b22- 24. See Averroes Tafsfr md ba'd al-Tab,A'ah, 
Book .Hfi' c.16, 1102; Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libri XIIII, VIII c.16, f. 225r F. 
4, It certainly is not an unintelligible form or a non-being or privation. 
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Anima, he said "The intellect is from the intelligible," meaning that the intellect in its 
essence and substance is only from the intelligible.4~ 
Later  Averroes  explains that there  are two sorts of  intelligibles, the intelligibles 
of  mat te r  which are intelligible in relation to something else (namely, a knower  
in vir tue o f  which these potential  intelligibles become actually intelligible) and 
the intelligibles of  the forms which are unders tood  in their  own right. These  
forms which are intelligible in themselves are substantial and are simple. And 
by simple here  is mean t  that the fo rm is f ree  o f  mat te r  and is not  a composite.43 
Hence ,  an existing separate fo rm as intelligible is an intelligible in act not  
d e p e n d e n t  in its intelligibility upon  a relat ion to something else. As such it is 
then an intelligible for  itself and so it is also intell igent or  an intellect in its own 
nature.  Hence ,  contrary  to the bel ief  of  Genequand ,  Averroes '  a rgumen t  is 
complete .  Any actually existing separate fo rm must  be an intellect. 
What  about  the celestial bodies and their  relat ionship to their  associated 
intellects? As Averroes  unders tands  Aristotle, the celestial bodies can only 
equivocally be said to have mat ter  and soul because our  use o f  those not ions is 
based upon  our  exper ience  in the sublunar  realm where soul gives actuality to 
mat ter  and the two principles make up  one  entity. Analogies based on what  is 
learned f rom the science of  Psychology have only limited value. In the case of  
celestial bodies, the body is not  p roper ly  speaking mat te r  actualized, that is, 
animated by separate principle,  soul. Rather,  the celestial bodies which we 
perceive in the heavens are immediately substantially existent  per  se and eter- 
nal since they have matters  which do not  have potency  for  substantial change.  
Celestial bodies move eternally and so have desire, bu t  they do no t  have sense 
percept ion  and do not  have imaginat ion and the cogitative power  as do 
sublunar  rat ional animals, that  is, as do h u man  beings. As Gerhard  Endress 
puts it, for  Averroes  "the senses and the organs o f  sense-percept ion exist only 
in mortal  animals, ' for the sake o f  preservation. '  But  the relat ion of  the heav- 
ens to their  principles o f  existence and m o v e m e n t  is d i f ferent  f rom the rela- 
tion between bodies and  souls in the sublunary world, making it possible to 
forego the in termediary  o f  imaginat ion postulated by Avicenna. '44 Thus ,  each 
4~ Averroes Tafsfr md ba~ al-Tatn~ah, Book Lfim c.37, 1600; Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libri XIIII, XII 
c.37, f. 319 v H-I.  Cf. G e n e q u a n d ,  t51: "Since the  intel lectual  r epresen ta t ion  which  is the  activity 
o f  the  intellect is the  intellect itself a nd  the  intellect is the  intelligible as has  been  shown in the  de 
Anima, [Aristotle] says: ' the  intellect comes  f rom the intelligible', m e a n i n g :  the  intellect in itself 
a n d  in its essence  comes  f r o m  the  intelligible." 
43 A verroes Tafsfr md ba"d al-Tabz~ah, Book Lfim c.37, x 6 o 2 -  3; Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libri XIIII, 
XII c.37 , f. 32or  A-C; G e n e q u a n d ,  t 5 ~ -  153. In  the  LCDA Aver roes  r emarks  tha t  "it is universal ly 
necessary  in regard  to intellect tha t  tha t  which  is intelligible in act be intellect in act . . . .  " I I I  c.36, 
48o. My translat ion.  
44Gerhard Endress ,  "Averroes '  De Caelo, Ibn  R u s h d ' s  Cosmology  in his C o m m e n t a r i e s  on 
Aristot le 's  On the Heavens," Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 6 (1995): 9 - 4 9 .  See 33. 
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o f  the e ternal ly  moving  celestial bodies has associated with it a separa te  intellec- 
tual soul which is fully immater ia l .  By means  o f  its association, the celestial 
body  moves  out  o f  desire which is intellectual in nature ,  that  is, by con templa -  
tive desire a roused  by conceptual izat ion by intellect (to4. awwur bi-l-~aql) of  intelli- 
gibles.45 And,  as we have seen, since the mot ion  of  the celestial body  is e ternal  
and  necessary, according to Aristotle and  Averroes ,  that  which makes  the 
mot ion  to occur, separa te  intellect, mus t  also exist e ternal ly and  mus t  have an 
immater ia l  and  imper i shable  na ture  as the f o r m  of  the celestial body.46 This  
sort  o f  exposi t ion draws u p o n  the science o f  soul or  Psychology, insofar  as it 
uses phi losophical  Psychology's under s t and ing  of  desire, o f  conceptual iza t ion  
by intellect, and  o f  corporea l  h u m a n  beings '  l inkage to separa te  intellect in 
conceptual izat ion by intellect in o rder  to under s t and  the association of  sepa- 
rate intellects with eternal ly moving  celestial bodies. 
. 
T h e  pu rpose  o f  this article has been  to explain how it is that  Aver roes  can 
assert  in his Long Commentary on the De Anima and in his Long Commentary on the 
Metaphysics that  principles of  the science of  Metaphysics  are established in the 
science of  Psychology, a science which is itself a b ranch  of  Natura l  Ph i losophy  
or Physics. We began  with a considerat ion o f  the r equ i remen t s  for  the asser- 
tion of  the existence of  a science of  First Ph i losophy  as Metaphysics  in Book  VI 
chap te r  1 of  Aristotle 's  Metaphysics. T h e r e  it was held  that  Natura l  Ph i losophy  
would be First Ph i losophy  if it could no t  be established that  there  exists sepa-  
rate or  immater ia l  being. Nex t  we under s tood  Averroes  to have p roved  the 
existence of  an immater ia l  separa te  fo rm as cause of  the mot ion  of  the celestial 
subs t ra tum.  This  was sufficient to satisfy the needs  expressed  by MetaphysicsVI 
1 for  the existence o f  an immater ia l  entity, and  allowed that  there  is a universal  
science of  be ing qua being  which deals with things beyond  those of  Physics, 
name ly  the science of  Metaphysics.  Yet the na tu re  of  this immater ia l  f o r m  was 
not  clear f r o m  the a r g u m e n t  of  the Physics. I t  was he re  that  Aver roes  u n d e r -  
stands the science of  Psychology to make  an i m p o r t a n t  cont r ibut ion  to the 
pr inciples  of  Metaphysics.  I t  is in Psychology that  h u m a n  intellectual unde r -  
s tanding is s tudied and  found  to require  the existence of  the separate  Agen t  
Intel lect  for  the accoun t  o f  the coming  to be of  knowledge as that  knowledge 
manifests  itself in h u m a n  beings. In this, then,  intellect and  separate  be ing  are 
established as one,  that  is, it is shown on the basis o f  the analysis o f  h u m a n  
Psychology that  intellect mus t  exist and  that  this intellect mus t  be separa te  
45 See the insightful and comprehensive account of the issue of celestial bodies and soul- 
intellects in the thought of Averroes by Endress in the article cited in note 44. 
46 Endress, 37- 
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from the human being in existence. Moreover, it is also established on the basis 
of the analysis of human knowing that there exists potency in those things 
called intellect, thanks to the argument for the existence of the Material Intel- 
lect. These key contributions from Psychology to the principles of the science 
of Metaphysics were explicitly recognized by Averroes in book Ldm of his 
Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. 
Perhaps the greatest value of this undertaking, however, is to clarify in 
some small way the understanding of Averroes concerning the interrelation- 
ship of the sciences of  Physics, Metaphysics and Psychology. In light of the role 
played by Psychology in establishing principles for Metaphysics, a number of 
otherwise seemingly non-Aristotelian doctrines can now be seen in an Aristote- 
lian context. One such doctrine is the plurality and hierarchy of separate 
intelligences or intellects discussed in Aristotle and Averroes. Aristotle never 
provided a sufficient account regarding the natures of the plurality of separate 
intellects or forms in Metaphysics XII. Certainly in the context of Aristode's 
thought there, it is impossible to conceive of these pure forms and pure actuali- 
ties as having any potency at all. Rather, each was a self-contained monad and 
only by reference to the motion it caused and by an argument from analogy 
could Aristotle put one of these intellects first as the highest god.47 
For Averroes, however, the intellects are ranked by differences in their 
potentiality, not potentiality in being, but potentiality in knowing.48 That such 
potentiality existed in some way in separate intellects Averroes might have 
taken as a given principle or assumption if he were more a follower of the 
Neoplatonic tradition. In that tradition as reflected in the Arabic materials 
derived from texts of Plotinus and Proclus, lower intellects are illuminated by 
higher intellects in a species of participation. The very possibility of being 
receptive to illumination indicates some sort of potentiality.40 But for Averroes 
47Aristotle's doctrine, complex and difficult, is dependent  on his understanding of goodness 
and unity. See J o h n  M. Rist, The Mind of Aristotle (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 
173-177 and 236-24o. 
4s "For it seems that  the cause of the plurality of the separate intellects is the difference in their 
natures, by which they receive the knowledge they gain of the First Principle and which acquire 
from the First Principle a unity which by itself is one single act, but  which becomes many through 
the plurality of the recipients, just  as there are many deputies under  the power of a king and many 
arts under  one art." A verroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence) translated by Simon 
Van Den Bergh (London: Luzac & Co., t969) , 154-155. Arabic text: Averrois. Tahafotat-tahafot, ed. 
Maurice Bouyges, S.J., (Beirut: lmprimerie Catholique, t93o), 16o. 
49The notion of potency in an immaterial intellect is reflected in a way in the Plotinian 
doctrine of the emanation of Being from the One and its, as it were, ontologically subsequent, 
fulfillment as Intellect. See, e.g., A. H. Armstrong, "Plotinus," in The Cambridge History of Later Greek 
and Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, x 967), 241-242. Also see 
Jean  Trouillard, "La Gen+se l 'hyl~morphisme selon Proclus," Dialogue 6 (1967-68): 1 - 17. Regard- 
ing the Arabic materials derivative upon the work of Plotinus and Procius, see Maroun Aouad, "La 
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the  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  d o x a  o r  t r a d i t i o n  d o e s  n o t  c ons t i t u t e  p h i l o -  
s o p h i c a l  p r o o f .  R a t h e r ,  h e  a r g u e d  fo r  his  s i m i l a r  p o s i t i o n  o n  the  basis  o f  u n d e r -  
s t a n d i n g s  o f  i n t e l l ec t  d e m o n s t r a t e d  in  A r i s t o t e l i a n  Physics ,  P s y c h o l o g y  a n d  
M e t a p h y s i c s .  T h a t  is to say, his  a c c o u n t  o f  the  n a t u r e s  a n d  h i e r a r c h y  o f  s e p a r a t e  
in te l l ec t s  is not N e o p l a t o n i c  b u t  Ar i s t o t e l i a n .  A n d  in t he  c o u r s e  o f  c o n s t r u c t i n g  
his  a r g u m e n t  h e  in s i s t ed  o n  the  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t he  ro l e  o f  h u m a n  r a t i o n a l i t y  a n d  
the  i nves t i ga t i on  o f  i t  in  t he  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t he  sc ience  o f  M e t a -  
phys ics .  T h e s e  p r i n c i p l e s  a r e  e s t a b l i s h e d  in his e x p o s i t i o n  o f  his  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  
a n d  d i f f icu l t  d o c t r i n e  o f  t he  s e p a r a t e  M a t e r i a l  I n t e l l ec t ,  a d o c t r i n e  p h i l o s o p h i -  
ca l ly  a r g u e d  by  h i m  u s i n g  A r i s t o t e l i a n  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  p r i n c i p l e s .  
Marque t te  University 
Th~ologie d'Aristote et Autres Textes du Plotinus Arabus," in Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques, ed. 
Richard Goulet (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1989), 541-59o; 
Gerhard Endress, Proclus Arabus. Zwanzig A bschnitte aus der Institutio Theologica in arabischer Obersetzung 
(Wiesbaden--Beyrouth: F. Steiner Verlag, 1973); and F. W. Zimmermann, "The Origins of the 
So-called Theology of Aristotle," in Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages. The Theology and Other Texts, ed.Jill 
Kraye, W. F. Ryan and C. B. Schmitt (London: The Warburg Institute, 1986), 1 lo-24o. Proposi- 
tion 5 of the Liber de causis mentions the diffusion of the light of the First Cause upon things below 
it. This part of Proposition 5 does not come from Proclus' Elements of Theology Proposition 123, but 
rather is derivative upon notions found in the Plotiniana Arabica. See the discussion in Richard C. 
Taylor, The Liber de causis (Kalam fi mahd al-khair) : A Study of Medieval Neoplatonism (Doctoral Disser ta- 
tion, University of Toronto, 1981 ), 372. For the doctrine in the Plotiniana Arabica, see, for example, 
Abdurrahman Badawi, Aflutin "inda-l-~arab (Kuwait, 1977, 3rd printing), 62.1-4; translation by 
Geoffrey Lewis, who prepared the English translation found in Plotini opera II, ed. Paul Henry and 
Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer (Paris & Bruxelles, 1959) 383 . For additional texts, see Taylor, The Liber de 
causis, 372. 
